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Water policies in China have been traditionally focused on meeting sectoral demands for 
water by increasing the supply rather than managing demand. However, effective water 
resource policies that focus on demand management and encourage efficient water use 
remain the main weakness of China’s water policy. Main potential for efficiency gain is the 
agricultural sector, In this paper we explore the potential for an improvement in policies that 
address water use efficiency and equity in one of China’s rural regions.     
Our analysis includes water use efficiency, water pricing and various policy interventions 
that are aimed at both increasing total welfare and improve income distribution along the 
canal. Especially we focus on study the impact of canal monitoring system on water resource 
allocation. We show how important it is for the public agency and the private users to 
cooperate in order to achieve water use efficiency and equity within the irrigation network. 
Policies include unregulated case, increased monitoring and enforcement of various water 
allocation methods, government subsidy to a certain grain products, etc. A General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) is employed to achieve the optimization process under the water 
system constraints and other policy regulation constraints.   
 
Keywords: Water efficiency, Equity, Irrigation water management 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
China’s water resources are scarce. While its renewable water resources amount to about 
2,841 km
3/year, the sixth largest in the world, the per capita availability, is estimated at 2,156 
m
3/year in 2007, which is one-fourth of the world average of 8,549 m
3/year (World Bank, 
2009). Given its limited water resource, policies in China have been traditionally focused on 
meeting sectoral demands for water by increasing the supply rather than managing demand. 
However, effective water resource policies that focus on demand management and encourage 
efficient water use remain the main weakness of China’s water policy. Main potential for 
efficiency gain is the agricultural sector, which accounts for 75.7 percent of total water 
withdrawals. Due to major inefficiencies in irrigation water systems only about 53 percent of 
water withdrawals for agriculture are actually used by farmers to irrigate their crops (Center 
for Irrigation and Drainage Development, China 2007). In addition to on-farm and water 
conveyance system inefficiencies, distorted market prices for certain crops my lead to 
inefficient cropping patterns and water allocations as well.    How to optimize water resource 
allocation and choose the proper cropping pattern in an irrigation area are major goals to 
achieve. How to do that while addressing equity among users introduces additional 
challenges.  
In this paper we explore impact of policies that address water use efficiency, optimal 
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allocation model is employed to maximize water use efficiency at both public water 
conveyance system and private on-farm water use in one of the irrigation districts in 
Northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. Water use efficiency is modeled along with efficient 
and optimal cropping patterns to be endogenously determined by the decision makers in the 
region. Water is provided by a government authority via a public canal to farmers. The public 
water conveyance system has a given efficiency that can be improved with investment to 
reduce deep percolation.  This can be done either by farmers or through cost sharing 
arrangements between farmers and the government. While each farmer has a water quota, 
diverting water from the canal is not regulated and the sequencing of the farmers along the 
canal dictates the access to water by each farmer.    Under the unregulated case equity may be 
the lowest, where the upstream users may divert unrestricted amounts and the downstream 
users may use the remainder.  Increased efficiency of the public canal may lead to more 
available subsidized canal water available to the upstream and downstream users.  In a 
parallel venue, when on-farm efficiency is improved, less water is returned to the aquifer, 
leaving less water as a return flow to be available to the downstream water users as ground 
water. In reality, cropping patterns are chosen by farmers individually. In this paper we 
assume there is a social planer who is going to optimize both water allocation and cropping 
pattern simultaneously along the canal, so as to reduce the complexity of the modeling 
process.    Gross margin are calculated for each farm and equity is calculated as a result of the 
derived welfare by each farm. 
Many studies evaluating the policy responses to water scarcity have been carried out 
around the world. Several approaches to assess and improve the performance of water use in 
agriculture exist, notably in terms of increasing the water use efficiency, that is, either the 
economic or the technical efficiency (Rosegrant &Gazmui, 1994;  Keller et al., 1996; 
Wichelns, 1999; Seckler et al., 1999; Cai et al., 2001, Ortega et al., 2003). Other authors have 
focused on the sustainable use of groundwater sources and on contamination problems 
(Hellergerset al., 2001; Gayatri & Edward, 2002; Roseta-Palma, 2002). Issues, such as how 
to utilize limited water resources most efficiently, how to measure the social cost of water 
price policies and how to protect the environment, have progressively attracted the attention 
of water researchers as well as practitioners (Dinar, 1993; Burt et al., 1997; Ray & williams, 
1999; Heaney et al., 2001; Blanke et al., 2007). Equity considerations in irrigated agriculture 
were addressed in various studies such as Tsur and Dinar (1995), Sur et al. (2002), and many 
others they cite. 
There has been little quantitative research on analyzing the impact of the joint 
performances of public and private sectors in general and on China’s irrigated agriculture and 
rural welfare in particular, especially with consideration of multi-cropping patterns choices 
and equity consequences. For modeling the water movements, this study follows an approach 
developed by Umetsu & Chakravorty (1998) and Chakravorty &Umetsu (2003) to investigate 
impacts and options for increasing water use (technical) efficiency in irrigation activities 
(either from public or private sectors) and to calculate the corresponding investment needs 
from the public and private sectors, respectively. In parallel, we will consider how social 
planer allocates the cropping patterns choices under regulated, unregulated and government 
intervention cases. Issues of efficiency and equity will be addressed via comparison of net 
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In this paper, we will focus on both water efficiency and water distribution equity. Water 
monitoring costs are introduced into the model to capture the impacts of policy intervention 
on water‘s distribution so that the equity and efficiency situation may be improved over the 
entire irrigation area by proper monitoring. 
A practical programming model has been developed that is based on collected field data. 
Instead of using simulated or borrowed relationship between water and crop yields and net 
revenue, coefficients are derived from an actual irrigation scheme in China by means of an 
econometric analysis of farmers’ behavior.  We rather use a discrete choice approach 
applying difference equations instead of differential equations, which makes the model usable 
for GAMS (Brooke et al., 1998;  McCarl, 2004). The approach offers a wide range of 
planning opportunities for irrigation management, and allows quick application to other 
regions.  
Since the study establishes a spatial water allocation model, which is based on an empirical 
study of farmers, specific policy recommendations for best practices and policies in irrigation 
system can be made. Specific implications of various schemes of cropping patterns, overall 
welfare, output and water pricing can be studied and assessed. By analyzing different 
scenarios, this paper tries to demonstrate how land size, cropping pattern, water pricing, 
resource rents and adoption of water saving techniques interact and how important 
coordination of private and public investments could be.     
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide an overview of the methodology 
applied in this study, which contains field survey findings and the modeling procedure. Then 
scenarios analysis and simulation results are discussed. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations are presented. 
 
2. Methodology of the study 
2.1 Field survey and empirical findings 
A field survey was conducted in a typical Chinese watershed in the county of Li Quan 
(Shaanxi Province) in 2001 and 2008. The irrigation system in the survey area is managed by 
a public authority. Most of farmers in the county grow apple for food exchange. Since recent 
years China has placed food security as one of its top national agenda, grain production is 
strongly encouraged with certain amount of government subsidy. Farmers allocate different 
land area to different cropping patterns by reckoning their agricultural return and natural 
condition. Wheat and corn are observed in this area as the ‘food security’ crops. With the 
relatively small farm holding in China, better water use efficiency and increased production 
revenue are essential to maintain and improve farmers’ welfare and food security. Since the 
region is drought-prone, there is a great pressure on farmers to invest in water saving 
technologies.   
Specifically, farmers locate close to head area can access cheaper public canal water, and 
they can get as much water as they need. These firmest probably have little incentive to 
increase on-farm efficiency. Their counterparts located at downstream areas are not as 
fortunate. They may have to face more expensive canal water due to increased maintenance 
and lifting costs or go for groundwater when canal water is used up (See Figure 1). With a 
pressure to lower their water costs, downstream farmers usually have much incentive to adopt 
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thing is that the expensive modern technology were adopted mostly by apple growers, since 
apple can make much better return as compared with wheat and corn production. The higher 
the water price, the more investment there is in irrigation technology and consequently the 
less water is consumed per unit of land. Given limited water supply and agricultural return, 
most of farmers go for apple production rather than grain production. This will be 
demonstrated by our modeling analysis as well. To reflect the unequal water resource 
distribution along the canal, water consumption volume based on different locations of 
farmers will be investigated. Further consequences of price increases and reduced water use 
are a reduction in the negative effects of excess irrigation as water waste and water logging 
and hence less salinization.   
 
2.2 Layout of the irrigation area 
The layout of the irrigation area is shown in Figure 1. There is a social planer who is 
responsible for optimizing water resources and cropping patterns over the entire area. The 
area is 7,500m long and 200m wide. So we got an area of 150 hectares which is translated 
into 150 locations in our modeling process.  We regard this small area as a representative, 
since Chinese farm size is very small. The natural conditions, such as soil, climate etc., is 
assumed identical and variations are not included in the model. All variables and parameters 
of the model are location-wise (spatially) variable.     
We include multi-cropping patterns under regulated and unregulated cases for canal 
water management and endogenous investments for irrigation. The irrigation system in the 
model is assumed to be a relatively closed water cycle system, instead of an open river basin 
and, importantly, it contains controlled inflows and outflows. For a further understanding, 
farmers are located sequentially along a public canal. They produce wheat, apple and corn 
using irrigation. The water use of each farmer along the canal is conditioned by the use of 
upstream farmers. There is a limited amount of surface water available for the analyzed area 
and it is not sufficient for the entire irrigation area. Additional quantity is amended by 
pumping groundwater.   
As shown in the figure 1, conjunctive water use is taken into consideration. There are 
three blocks in the irrigation area. All farmers have access to public canal water and 
groundwater. Farmers extract water from the canal to irrigate their land. Meanwhile, water 
can be lost from poorly maintained water conveyance system or farmers’ field.  For those 
situated at plain area, where winter wheat is grown, they have better access to abundant and 
cheap public canal water. The lowest water price might lead to overuse of water at the head 
area. For those farmers living at hilly, higher elevation areas, where apple production is 
dominating, they get water from public canal with a higher price due to an additional (stage 1 
station) lift-height pumping cost. At last, water will be delivered to mountainous area where 
corn is grown. A stage 2 lift-height pumping station lifts the water again to irrigate the corn’s 
fields. Consequently the water price is almost 6 folds of the original water price at the plain 
area. Corn needs less water than wheat and apple. Farmers may reduce their water costs 
either by reducing canal water application, groundwater pumping, and dry land farming or by 
changing cropping pattern. A canal controller or examiner will be introduced to canal 
management. The corresponding canal monitoring costs enables us to analyze the impacts of 
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Figure 1:  Water flow and potential cropping pattern allocation in the survey area 
 




We assume that a point C, as shown in Figure 1, will emerge somewhere in watershed, at 
which farmers stop using canal water and switch to groundwater. It is choice dependent. Point 
C (stretch of canal, see results) depends on the efficient use of water.
1 It is endogenous to the 
system and it will be determined by the model. This implies that, farmers located prior point 
C, extract water from the public canal rather than from the groundwater aquifer. This is 
reasonable since the cost of canal water is much lower than that of groundwater pumping. 
Canal water is provided by the public water supplier with government subsidy. The canal 
water price for farmers cannot cover its actual production and conveyance costs. 
Groundwater costs normally depend upon the well depth. The deeper the well is, the more 
expensive the groundwater will be. For simplicity we only consider the pumping costs, that is, 
electricity costs for groundwater, even though it is still much higher than canal water costs. 
Around point C, the groundwater supply gradually becomes the dominant water source up to 
the tail area. Importantly, relatively expensive groundwater should encourage farmers to 
adopt modern irrigation technologies to save water and lower the costs (Fang, 2004). In our 
model, the pumping costs vary with distance. This means that with increasing distance from 
the last water delivery from the canal, the water table falls gradually and this increases 
extraction costs. Apparently this is approved by empirical observations in the researched 
watershed. Water price will affect farmers’ behavior, either at water consumption level or 
                                                        
1 We should mention that point C may occur, under extreme situations, in the second irrigation area. 
Wheat friendly region
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  5cropping pattern choices.     
For methodological reason, the adoption of different types of irrigation techniques is an 
important factor that needs to be considered. In this study, we adopt the most continuous 
presentation of space and types of technologies rather than a discrete choice of technology 
selection. In previous studies, researchers often regarded technologies to be discrete and 
exogenous, rather than making them choice variables (Caswell & Zilberman, 1985; 
Chakravorty et al., 1995; Umetsu & Chakravorty, 1998; Chakravorty & Umetsu, 2003). One 
argument of this study is that all kinds of techniques are in a continuous set and choice 
depends on monetary costs and benefits rather than a kind of fixed technical coefficient. 
Apparently we have discrete technologies, but we should look at the variation in water use 
efficiency and investment from a functional view point. We can categorize technologies along 
a track of marginal costs (production function). Our water efficiency function is a quadratic 
one and we consider investment in technologies as occurrences along a continuous line. By 
this approach the model can optimize technologies and corresponding investments 
endogenously instead of exogenously fixing them. 
 
2.3 Econometric model 
This study builds a comprehensive mathematical modeling framework to carry out data 
processing and social welfare optimization. The framework contains two packages, an 
econometric model of regression analysis and a programming model (General Algebraic 
Modeling System-GAMS). Natural conditions, such as soil, climate etc., are assumed similar 
across the watershed and excluded from model.  All variables and parameters of the model 
are location-dependent (spatially) variables.     
Our econometric model framework contains several functions, including effective water 
demand function; on-farm water efficiency function; canal water loss rate function; and 
monitoring costs function. 149 farmers were interviewed along the canal and their production 
data was recorded, we also had interviews with officials from local water authority so as to 
collect some data related to public investment for canal water conservation.     
Based on our field survey data and related literature, we e estimated three effective water 
demand function for apple production, wheat production, and corn production, respectively, 
using linear regression approach   
2 1 60.26 4.1*10 * 3.2* EWI
− =− − C W P                                ( 1 )
2
2 2 84.63 7.4*10 * 7.152* EWI
− =− − C W P                       ( 2 )
3
2 3 51.22 5.4*10 * 6.5* EWI
− =− − C W P
                                                       
                               ( 3 )
4
Where,  EW is the effective water consumption per Mu (Mu is Chinese land measure:15 
Mu=1 ha), I is an annual investment per Mu in water saving technologies. And CWP is canal 
water price, which varies over location.    . Effective water consumption can be calculated by 
total water consumption multiplied by on-farm water use efficiency. On-farm water use 
 
2 Statistical parameters for equation (1) are t = 23.61, t = –2.85, t = -3.61, n = 141, R
2 = 0.359, F = 39. 3 sign.F = 0.0000 
3 Statistical parameters for equation (1) are t = 26.50, t = –3.305, t = -4.767, n = 141, R
2 = 0.347, F = 36.634 sign.F = 0.0000 
4 Statistical parameters for equation (1) are t = 22.8, t = –3.45, t = -4.11, n = 141, R
2 = 0.36, F = 38. 5 sign.F = 0.0000 
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These demand functions are interacting with irrigation investment I, canal water price 
CWP as well as on-farm water efficiency. We are only concerned with the canal water price 
rather than groundwater price, since it is a factor that can affect farmers’ behaviors much as 
compared with groundwater price. Groundwater costs vary with location. The pumping costs 
in the highest elevation are the most expensive.   
Since on-farm water efficiency is one of the key measurements of optimal water resource 
allocation, it is essential to introduce it as a coefficient in the water demand function. To do 
so, we specified the coefficient of water use efficiency as a proportional factor (0<h<1). The 
empirical analysis of the farm water use efficiency function, as dependent on investments, is 
presented in equation (4). It is quadratic and is derived from individual farm calculations of 
water balances (Fang, 2004). Note that the efficiency is calculated as a net efficiency without 
precipitation:  
h = 0.48 + 0.0025 × I – 2.94 × 10
–6 × I
2                             ( 4 )  
5   
  Specifically h depends on investments and can be interpreted as an individual on-farm 
water use efficiency, which is a percentage of water utilized to water applied. I is private 
investment/Mu and other factors are assumed constant and are captured by the intercept.   
A canal water loss measure “a” is a coefficient describing the efficiency of public water 
management (also for programming). It is used to evaluate the efficiency of a conveyance 
system. The canal water loss function depends on public investment (mainly lining and 
maintenance-cleaning) and is based on the field survey data as well as relevant literature. The 
function has been estimated as: 
a = –0.000405K + 5.25 × 10
–7 K
2  +  0.74                          (5)
6     
Again, our regression analysis suggests that “a” (the canal water loss rate, in % per km) 
depends on K, which is the public investment. Equation (5) reveals significant impacts of K. 
Hereby, we follow a strategy of having non-discrete investment types, although building 
canals is normally discrete with concrete or tubes. (Observations and decision are modeled as 
continuous investment opportunities.) 
The canal water monitoring costs function is highly dependent on the location and water 
consumption volume. Upstream farmers have more opportunities to extract much water from 
the public canal as they can, but such a possibility for downstream farmers will be lower. 
Further, the more water is consumed, the more monitoring is needed. For canal monitoring, 
the costs would be high at upstream and low at downstream. The function is specified as 
below:   
M(j)=547-1.8*ord(j)-0.45*cw(j)                                  (6)
7
Where M(j)= monitoring costs at location j 
ord(j) = order of the location j   
cw(j)=canal water demand at location j 
2.4 Mathematical programming model 
To deal with the programming aspect of the approach, an objective function and several 
constraints are to be constructed. In our case the objective function is designed by a 
                                                        
5 Statistical parameters for equation (4) are t = 66.12, t = –11.98, t = 18.76, n = 141, R
2 = 0.840, F = 361.13, sign.F = 0.0001 
6 Statistical parameters for equation (5) are t = –5.019, t = 3.534, t = 6.903, n = 30, R
2 = 0.745, F = 19.02, sign.F = 0.0001 
7 Statistical parameters for  equation  (6)  are  t=22.55  t=-8.86  t=-3.24  n=58,  R
2=0.89, F=234.61 sign.F=0.0001 
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farmers produce different crops with irrigation and maximize gross margins.   
The gross margin is calculated as the revenue minus the expenditure on water 
conservation and other water-related costs. Non water costs are not included, such as 
fertilizers, labor, etc. The constraints include the land constraints, water constraints, water 
demand function for different crops, on-farm water use efficiency function, canal water loss 
rate function and two sets of equations of motion for canal water and groundwater movement. 
When the regulated case is considered, monitoring costs function will be incorporated to the 
objective function.    In particular, the equations of motion are the most important constraints 
in the spatial model. Then, owing to the high non-linear characteristics of the objective 
function and constraints, the model was solved by using GAMS solver Conopt.   
All variables and parameters of the model are location specific (spatially differentiated) 
variables, while the locations are connected through a new dimension: the direction and 
length of the canal. In such a case the mathematics of control theory, which is found in 
dynamic optimization, can be applied to space. Normally space is a continuous dimension. 
For technical reasons, our model is discrete It splits a potential distance of 7.5 km, for a canal, 
in 150 locations (each of 50 m length along the canal given by the size of a farm). Then, if the 
watershed has a width of 200 m, it means each farm (a discrete choice unit along the distance 
of canal) has 1 ha (200 m × 50 m). By this spatial framing, the objective function of the 
spatial programming fits into a set-up that maximizes the overall gross margin of 150 farmers 
living in a survey area. Mathematically the sum of individual functions gives the gross 
margin (social welfare) of farms in the watershed. The gross margin objective function is the 
sum of all farmers’ revenues at each location j minus costs for water procurement, costs from 
investing in water saving technologies and costs for monitoring the canal. 
By focusing on individual efficient uses of water on farms and in the watershed, the 
gross margin of the project area is maximized summing up over the distance of the canal.   
Then, in line with a mathematical formulation the objective function can be presented as: 
. . (900* 4000* 1500* ) 15*( ) 0.05 wA C jj j j j j jj j j j j MaxGM X X X I CWP CW GWP GW M K =++ − +× +× − − ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  (7)
                                                         
Where  
j = location, ranging from 1 to 150 in the model, since it represents a stretch every 50 m along 
the canal, that is, the total length of irrigation system is 10 km (Notely in the following 
equations of motion, we will let j start from 2-150 for modeling the water movement). 
G.M. =overall gross margins over the irrigation area 
Xw=land for growing wheat 
XA=land for growing apple 
XC=land for growing corn 
Ij = annual private investment in technology in Yuan/Mu at location j 
Kj = annual public investment in water conveyance in Yuan/km at location j (K is measured in 
Yuan/km, one unit of j (50 m) is equivalent of 0.05 length of one kilometer, so it has a 
coefficient 0.05) 
CWPj = price of canal water at location j 
GWPj = price of groundwater at location j 
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GWj = groundwater consumption at location j 
M=monitoring costs at location j, which was achieved based on location j, no need to convert 
by 15.   
(Note: the objective function becomes Mu-related by employing a coefficient of “15”. It 
converts Chinese land measures “Mu” to 1 ha (15 Mu are equal to 1 ha).   
Land constrains: 
Xw+XA+XC≤2250                                                  (8)                      
Water constrains (include canal water and initial groundwater stock):   
TW≤20100                                                       (9)                     
 
Next, following the notation of dynamic optimization, equations of motion are the 
constituting constraints in a spatial-dynamic model (now to be interpreted as spatial 
movement from the head to the tail of the watershed: 7.5 km). In this model, equations of 
motion are transformed to a location specification. Technically one can speak of difference 
equations. For us, they are central elements to solve a location problem. Since canal water is 
moving with location and groundwater stocks are also changing, water flows can be 
expressed as difference equations of spatial motion. Remember, an equation of motion (now 
spatial) is a classical concept in dynamic optimization procedures (Chiang,  1992). Our 
equation of motion for canal water flows given the modeling framework is expressed as 
fulfilling GAMS model requirements (McKinney & Savitsky, 2003; Dellink et al., 2001). It 
can be specified, as below, with the initial condition: 
crem1 = cw0 – 15 × cw1                     ( 1 0 )  
and discrete flow motion: 
cremj = (1 – aj–1) × cremj–1 –15 × cwj           ( 1 1 )  
where additionally: 
cremj = canal water at location j 
aj–1 = canal water loss rate at location j–1 
Note: j starts from 2 to 150   
Equation (10) is the initial condition for canal water flows, where cw0 represents the 
external water supply for the irrigation scheme. “cw1“ is the quantity of canal water 
consumed by the first farmer within the first 50 m and crem1 is therefore the canal water that 
remains after the first extraction. This remaining water then passes down to the next farmer. 
In total we have 150 decision-making units for a potential distance of 7.5 km which are 
connected through the flows. If enough water is available and water is not merely used at the 
head area, all farmers might receive water, but this is hypothetical. Overuse at the head will 
normally result in no water for those living at the tail. 
Equation (11) describes the amount of canal water that remains at location j. As a general 
function of motion, equation (11) is expressed as a volume of water that remains from the 
previous location, j–1, minus water consumption at the present location, j. Note that cremj, 
which represents remaining canal water, that is the canal water stock at location j, is not only 
a technical matter. We introduce a water loss rate aj–1, defined as previous behavioral 
equation; it represents a canal water loss rate at location j–1.  
Since equation (11) is the basic concept for canal water flow, in principle, a similar 
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At an initial point, in equation (12), groundwater stocks start to build up from the head of the 
survey area. This implies that there is an initial condition for groundwater stock at the water 
source, that is, at location 0. We assume gw0 = A. where A is given as a scalar in the model. 
Then “grem1” is the groundwater remaining at the first location. In terms of the terminal 
condition, however, groundwater is free of restrictions; it only has to be given a lower bound 
of zero in the optimization process.   
It is important to recognize that groundwater aquifers are recharged by water seepage 
from the canal and deep percolation from farmer’s fields. The model therefore suggests that 
groundwater stocks will increase from point zero to C owing to a recharge from both sources, 
canal seepage and field deep percolation, apparently without any extraction before point C (in 
Figure 1). The reason for no-extraction is that canal water is cheaper than groundwater. 
Farmers have no need and incentive to pump groundwater before point C, though technically 
they could supplement canal water with ground water. After point C, there is less water 
flowing in the canal, thus groundwater extraction starts from this point and supplements canal 
water. This implies that recharges from canal water become zero. From point C the 
groundwater can only be recharged by seepage from farmers’ fields. The mathematical 
formulation of the equation of motion for groundwater change is presented below in 
Equations (12) and (13): 
Initial condition: 
grem1 = gw0 + β × (1 – h1) × 15 × tw1 – 15 × gw1        ( 1 2 )  
Discrete flow motion: 
gremj = gremj–1 + β × aj–1 × cremj–1 – 15 × gwj + β × (1 – hj) × 15 × twj  (13) 
where additionally: 
gremj = groundwater at location j 
hj = on-farm water efficiency at location j (note 15 is a correction for area measurement in Mu 
and ha) 
β = recharge rate 
Note: j starts from 2 to 150 
The first part is similar to the previous explanation. For a further understanding of the 
equations, the second part is the fraction of groundwater recharged. From the first farmer’s 
field no charges occur (in equation 12). β is defined as the recharge rate for groundwater, tw1 
is the conjunctive water used at the first location and h1 is the water efficiency in the first 
location as well. Finally, gw1 is the groundwater consumption at the first location. Then 
equation (12) gives the change of groundwater stock at any location except the first location. 
The variable gremj represents the groundwater remaining from the previous farmer to the next 
farmer at location j; here j starts from farmer 2. Since β is the recharge rate for groundwater, 
β × aj–1 × cremj–1 represents the fraction of water loss from the canal and it can be recharged 
to the aquifer at the location j–1. At any location water can be recharged to the aquifer. The 
element gwj is the groundwater quantity extracted by an individual farmer at location j. The 
last fraction β  × (1 – hj)  × 15 ×  twj represents the joint water volume, that is, pumped 
groundwater and surface water losses from a field, which recharges the groundwater aquifer 
at location j.  
In the current study, the equations of motion for groundwater calculats groundwater stock 
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To complete, water balances are given for each location, they are dynamically modeled 
by equation (11) and (13). The sets of equations serve as important constraints in the spatial 
model. In combination with above presented equations and the objective function, we can 
build a concise model of spatial water and allocation. The numerical models are programmed 
in GAMS and presented as scenarios. 
 
3. Scenarios analysis and simulation results 
  Three scenarios are designed to test the impacts of different policies on overall gross 
margin of the irrigated area, water allocation and equity distribution of net income in the 
study area. The first two scenarios are focused on the performance of canal monitoring 
system. The third scenario evaluates the impacts of government food security policy, 
captured by a subsidy to grain production. In the first scenario an unregulated canal system 
serves as our benchmark. It indicates that farmers, especially those situated at head area, can 
take water as much as they need/want. In the second scenario we analyze the impacts of canal 
regulation system. Since total water capacity in the study area is constrained and insufficient 
for all farmers, it is essential, as an equitable policy, to ensure that as many farmers as 
possible benefit from cheap public canal water. To achieve this, we introduce a canal 
examiner to regulate farmers’ behavior on water diversion. In the third scenario, we analyze 
the impacts of government subsidy to grain production.   
3.1. Unregulated canal management scenario (UCM) 
To derive comparisons, the results of UCM scenario are used as a benchmark or baseline 
scenario. From this benchmark other scenarios can be evaluated. This scenario assumes that 
farmers at the previous locaiton have the priority to take water as much as they need. The 
public investment K and private investment are endogenous variables in the UCM scenario. 
The recharge rate for groundwater is 0.3, which is at a low permeability rate and we operate 
150 potential locations. Essential model results are presented in Table 1 which shows drastic 
changes if other policies occur. The major findings will be explained in comparison with the 
other scenarios. 
 
3.2. Regulated canal management scenario (RCM) 
To analyze the impact of monitoring system, we introduced a canal monitoring function into 
the model. All the other variables and parameter are kept the same as in the UCM case. 
Results and a comparison of both scenarios are given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Comparison of indicators between unregulated (UCM) and regulated canal 
management (RCM) scenarios.   
Items  UCM  RCM  RCM to UCM% 
Gross margin (Yuan)  8,745,003  8,623,621  -1.39 
Land for wheat (Mu)  0  0   
Land for apple(Mu)  2,250  2,250  0.00 
Land for corn (Mu)  0  0   
Total canal water consumption (m3)  200,000  199,858    -0.07 
  11Total groundwater consumption (m3)  28,280  1,142  -95.96 
Total water consumption (m3)  228,280  201,000  -11.95 
Capacity of water supply (m3)  201,000  201,000  0.00 
Total public investment (Yuan)  37,158  43,505  17.08 
Switch point (Location)  126  149  18.25 
Total monitoring costs(Yuan)  0  55,669   
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu)    1,890  2,235  18.25 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu)  345  30  -91.30 
Total private investment (Yuan)  7,460  13,084  75.39 
Notes: UCM indicates unregulated canal management scenario; RCM indicates regulated 
canal management scenario 
Source: Model calculations 
 
In the unregulated canal management scenario UCM, the gross margin over the irrigation 
area reaches 8,745,003 Yuan, which is slightly 1.39% more than regulated case. With the 
allocation of optimal cropping pattern, the model results show us that all farmers go for apple 
production. A total 2250 Mu of land are grown apple, no matter if the canal is regulated or 
unregulated. However, other indicators in the regulated case show considerable improvement 
as compared to the unregulated case. Though total canal water consumption at both scenarios 
almost reached the limit 200,000m
3, the impacts are much different. In unregulated case, the 
canal water can flow to location 126, it means the only farmers prior 126 locations can get 
access to public canal water, the rest 24 locations farmers have no access to canal water, since 
the water has been used up by previous farmers. In this case, area irrigated by canal water is 
1,890Mu which is 18.25% less than a regulated canal.  Meanwhile, area irrigated by 
groundwater is 345 Mu, which is 91.30% more than RCM, since more farmers have to pump 
groundwater to irrigate their land. As a comparison, in a regulated canal, canal water can 
reach to location 148, it implies that only the last two location farmers has to pump 
groundwater. With the extended water flowing in the canal, public investment in the regulated 
case is important in improving the efficiency in the public canal system. The public 
investment is about 17% more than in the unregulated case. The private investment has 
significant improvement as well which is about 75% more than unregulated scenario. The 
monitoring forces upstream farmers to take less canal water and adopt water saving 
technology to lower their water application. Meanwhile, the monitoring system makes more 
farmers benefit from public water system. 
Besides the above mentioned indicators, we may see some sequential change at each 
location by observing some figures. Figure 2 shows a comparison of canal water consumption 
in the unregulated and regulated scenarios. The blue line represents the canal water 
consumption along the canal. Since each farmers will take water as much as they can, it is 
clearly seen the figure, canal water is used up quickly. At location 126 farmers have to switch 
to groundwater use, since no water left in the canal. But in regulated case, things can be 
improved a lot. The pink line represents the water consumption in regulated canal. We see 
  12that canal water can extend to 148th location, almost reaching the end of the canal. Therefore, 
most of farmers benefit under regulation.   
 
















































Figure 3. Comparison of investment in irrigation technology in unregulated (UCM) and 










































Figure 3 suggests that all farmers under the regulated case will invest more on irrigation 
technology as compared with the unregulated case, since their water volume is limited. They 
have to use their water more efficiently. It is a great positive impact that regulation will force 
farmers to use their water more efficiently rather than taking water as much as they can. On 
the other hand, as shown in Figure 4, farmers may get less water related revenue under the 
regulated scenario, since they spend more on water saving technology and they are forced to 
pay for the monitoring costs as well. The water costs burden becomes higher for them, 
compared with the unregulated case. Nevertherless, these costs can be considered the social 
payment for equity improvement in the watershed. As is shown in Table 1, the amount 
reduced by monitoring costs accounts for only 1 % as compared to the gross margin of the 
irrigation area. The social cost of achieving equity in a society is reasonable and acceptable in 




Figure 4. Comparison of water related revenue in unregulated (UCM) and regulated (RCM) 










































3.3 Government subsidy to wheat scenario (GSW) 
Apple is chosen by social planer in the previous two scenarios, since it can maximize profit. 
What will happen if the government makes efforts to support wheat production? We assume 
that wheat growing may have the same profit as apples does (meaning that the government is 
interested in food security and subsidizes grain production), then we see the results is shown 
in Table 2. The social planner did change the cropping pattern allocaiton. Land for wheat is 
1127 Mu, as compared with no wheat in scenario UCM. And apple still captures 1123 Mu 
due to its high return. Since this is an exogenous change, we cannot see any other impacts on 
the remaining indicators. The clear result is that government’s subsidy will directly affect the 
farmer’s cropping pattern’s distribution.
8   
 
Table 2:    Comparison of indicators between UCM and GSW to wheat scenario (GSW).   
 
Items  UCM  GSW    GSW to UCM %   
Gross margin (Yuan)  8745003    8745003    0   
Land for wheat (Mu)  0    1127     
Land for apple(Mu)  2250    1123    -50 
Land for corn (Mu)  0    0     
Total canal water consumption (m3)  200000    200000    0   
Total groundwater consumption (m3)  28280    28280    0   
Total water consumption (m3)  228280    228280    0   
Capacity of water supply (m3)  201000    201000    0   
Total public investment (Yuan)  37158    37158    0   
Switch point (Location)  126    126    0   
Total monitoring costs(Yuan)  0    0     
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu)    1890    1890    0   
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu)  345    345    0   
Total private investment (Yuan)  7460    7460    0   
Notes: UCM indicates unregulated canal management scenario; RCM indicates regulated canal 
                                                        
8 While apple is a perennial crop and wheat and corn are annual crops, our model is a planning model, which 
assumes that once a land allocation decision is made it will be kept for long time period. 
  14management scenario; GSW indicates the government subsidy to wheat production scenario 
Source: Model calculations 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on the model and simulation results, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, 
Water regulation is essential and helpful for water resource management. From a point of 
view of equity, it enables more farmers get access to public water; so that the equity situation 
over the irrigation area can get improved. From the point view of efficiency, it can foster 
farmers to adopt modern irrigation technology, since it affects their behaviors regarding water 
application. As rational consumers, they have the incentive to use their water more efficiently. 
Although regulation creates a certain costs for society, in our analysis it is certainly within a 
reasonable range that improves both efficiency and equity in an irrigation system.   
China is placing food security as one of its national top policy agenda. To make sure that 
performance of a policy of prompting grain production have positive impacts overall, it is 
essential to have a proper subsidy policy which should be strong enough to affect farmers’ 
decision on cropping pattern allocation, water use efficiency and distributional equity.   
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